None of the users had even heard of these opinions, since the Council and the Commission obviously preferred that internal disputes or contradictory discussions concerning the legal issues around the patent package should not reach the public, but rather be sorted out internally. This reasoning was even used officially as a justification to users when rejecting their requests for documents on the legislative process as shown in the following example.
The . . . negative effects of divulgation to the public could . . . affect the ratification process in the Member States willing to participate in the envisaged agreement [emphasis added]. 3 The same happened with the Rules of Procedure. The version which was supposed to be published for discussion with users was ready for circulation in November, even before the vote by Parliament in December and before the signing of the Agreement. The circulation of the draft was delayed, since it has proven a viable way to prevent discussions, if nobody knows what to discuss.
Compromise by misrepresentation: Cameron misled?
(1) Lehne also speaks about the alleged compromise found after Articles 6-8 of the Regulation had been deleted upon request by David Cameron, a request which had been supported by the Council. Commenting on the solution, Lehne found that:
As a result of the reference from the regulation to the agreement these rules of national law have been adopted into European law so that referral proceedings to the CJEU are very likely. . . . Cameron sold the deletion of Articles 6-8 as a gigantic success [emphasis added]. This is a bit surprising since Cameron must have been persuaded that the solution found constituted a fulfilment of his request. Lehne is of the opinion that the substance of Cameron's concerns has not changed, since he believes that the CJEU will remain competent to decide on issues of patent infringement as they are now contained in Articles 25-27 of the Agreement on the Unified Patent Court. This means that users must be prepared for having their cases referred to Luxembourg, and that questions of patent infringement which are at the core of nearly every patent case will be interpreted by judges who have no experience in patent law. This is contrary to what industry-and, rightly, Cameronwanted to obtain.
(2) Resolutions and decisions have often been achieved in Brussels by selling to some Member States as white something which is in reality black, and then call this a compromise. This procedure was referred to as 'horse trading' 4 a few month ago by the well-known German magazine Der Spiegel in a comprehensive article on the EU practice. In fact, Lehne and Rapkay used the same expression after the Summit 'deal' in June 2012, accusing the Council of 'horse trading' and of a 'scandalous breach of procedure '. 5 This shows that one must have sympathy for Cameron's announcement of a referendum, since this kind of policy-making should no longer be tolerated. Is it not appalling when governments must expect that their colleagues in the Council, the Commission and the Parliament hide from them negative legal consequences and traps contained in a legislative proposal? How should a head of state or a prime minister react when, on top of such a wilful deception, its success is later announced as a victory over an in good faith unsuspicious government delegation?
(3) Ironically, the joy about the proclaimed 'victory' of the Brussels negotiators over the British requestwhich was also one of the biggest concerns of European industry at large 6 -has not lasted long, since it may have added to a serious incident of blocking the whole project. The announcement of a referendum by the UK (one of the hosting countries for a branch of the Central Court and a member which must ratify the Agreement in order to fulfil one of the requirements for its entry into force) will create a growing uncertainty during the ratification process also in other countries.
7 Will national parliaments enter into difficult discussions over an unpredictable new court system, which Lehne called in his interview 'the second best solution', with the prospect that one of the major and legally necessary players will withdraw from the project?
Cost
Another topic which has always been one of the most important issues for industry, in particular small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), is the promised reduction of cost for users. Promises of a reduction of costs for patent filing and patent litigation can be found by the hundred in political speeches and press releases from Brussels over the past years. For several years, users have not stopped asking for precise figures concerning patent filings, maintenance fees as well as litigation cost, and now will costs be eliminated altogether? The Chartered Institute of Patent Attorneys commented on one of those announcements:
[T]he statement is strong on hopes and weak on certainties . . .. We share the concerns expressed by the professions that the UPC will be prohibitively expensive [emphasis added].
Even one of the economic advisors of the Commission, Pottelsberge, warned in an interview: ' The new patent might well be very expensive' [emphasis added].
The Commission and the Council preferred to keep silent on the details. They were only interested in obtaining political agreement of the Member States while imparting as little information as possible before disclosing the inevitable acknowledgement, which industry had feared and which Lehne has now admitted to for the first time after having pushed his equally uninformed colleagues in the Parliament to a favourable vote: ' The new patent will not be cheaper. Therefore the parallel system of national and European (EP) bundle patents will be maintained as an option' [emphasis added].
One of the many sceptical voices remarked: ' [Even] 70% lower cost is not realistic and only political PR language or even autosuggestion.' 10 Now users can expect that after the signing of the UPC, one piece of information after another will be disclosed which had been deliberately withheld.
Does everybody really welcome the patent package?
Lehne who, on the one hand, seems to be realistic about the inferior quality of the patent package ('second best'), on the other hand makes another remark in the interview which the great majority of users must have taken as a joke: ' (the Commission, the Council and the Parliament) on the legality of the Cypriot compromise for the Unitary Patent regulation. In spite of serious doubts of the legal service of the European Parliament as to the compatibility of the proposed texts with the Treaty, the European Parliament voted by a large majority in favour of the two regulations.
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All these voices do not really support Lehne's view that the Agreement is 'undisputed'. Maybe his remark was indeed a joke.
More legal problems for the UPC to solve
It is still too early to speculate about the fate of the Agreement in the national parliaments during the ratification procedure. However, it may perhaps be interesting to examine the legal requirements for its entry into force which one finds in Article 89 of the Agreement on the Unified Patent Court (UPC).
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Few authors have dealt with the details of this provision of Article 89. Official Publications only mention the ratification procedure by a minimum number of Member States and keep silent about further conditions. The legal questions deriving from the second sentence of Article 89(1) may however create some intricate discussions which again had not been mentioned before the signing of the Agreement on 19 February 2013.
Amendment of Regulation 1215/2012
(1) The first condition in the second sentence of Article 89 UPC is quite clear, namely that the UPC cannot enter into force without prior amendment of Regulation 1215/2012-the amended Regulation 44/2001 on jurisdiction. It is interesting that this regulation has just been overhauled and recast in December 2012, but without any reference to the jurisdiction rules of the UPC. So it will be necessary to prepare another amendment of this regulation taking on board the jurisdiction rules of the UPC. What Article 89(1) second sentence UPC then stipulates when speaking of 'amendments to the Regulation concerning its relationship with the Agreement' is not immediately clear and needs further examination.
(2) In 2011, Axel Horns examined 17 a piece of legal advice by the Commission's legal services dealing with the compatibility between the Agreement and the EU legal order. The text of this legal advice 18 was one of those ominous 'non-papers' the publication of which had first been withheld but, upon express request, made accessible, and has then been published on a private blog.
19 This document not only examined the compatibility with respect to questions which were the subject of the CJEU decision of 8 March 2011. One of the recommendations of the legal service was that it would be highly desirable to clarify in the UPC how the jurisdiction rules of the Brussels I Regulation should apply in the context of the UPC Agreement.
It requested in this context modifications of the former Articles 15 and 15a of the UPC dealing with jurisdiction, which have now become Articles 32 -34 in the last version of the Agreement. (1) This Agreement shall enter into force on 1 January 2014 or on the first day of the fourth month after the deposit of the thirteenth instrument of ratification or accession in accordance with Article 84, including the three Member States in which the highest number of European patents had effect in the year preceding the year in which the signature of the Agreement takes place or on the first day of the fourth month after the date of entry into force of the amendments to Regulation (EU) No (1215/2012 concerning its relationship with this Agreement, whichever is the latest. It follows that Regulation 1215/2012 must once more be amended, this time concerning its relationship with the Agreement.
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Content of amendment
(1) The text for this amendment is not discussed further. The obvious modifications which are required relate among others to Articles 7(2) and 8(2) for cases of patent infringement and Article 24(4) Regulation 1215/ 2012 with respect to revocation requests in accordance with Articles 32 -34 UPC which provide a far-reaching cross-border power which national courts do not have under Regulation 1215/2012 now.
Competence under Article 3(2) TFEU
If agreement on the amendments of Regulation 1215/ 2012 can be achieved which satisfies the necessary 'relationship' between the UPC and Regulation 1215/2012, the legal significance of this amendment and its scope may open another construction site, as discussed by Gibus.
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The critical point here is Article 3(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which reads:
The Union shall . . . have exclusive competence for the conclusion of an international agreement when . . . its conclusion may affect common rules or alter their scope. [emphasis added] Does this mean that the member states would not be competent to conclude the UPC? That Regulation 1215/ 2012 belongs to the common rules of the EU legal order is obvious. That it would be affected and alter its scope if several of its core jurisdiction rules for patent cases are modified in a way by which the former national courts dealing with patent cases are replaced by an international court cannot be denied. This also applies when the scope of jurisdiction of existing courts will be considerably limited to cases based on national patents, and a new court which did not exist before would be added for EP and unitary patents.
The ESM case of the CJEU ('Pringle')
The CJEU only recently provided an interpretation of Article 3(2) TFEU in Pringle.
24 The Court held in paras 100 and 101: 100. It must be recalled that, under Article 3(2) TFEU, the Union is to have 'exclusive competence for the conclusion of an international agreement when its conclusion . . . may affect common rules or alter their scope.
101. It follows also from that provision that Member States are prohibited from concluding an agreement between themselves which might affect common rules or alter their scope. [emphasis added] In such a case the EU has exclusive competence and the member states are no longer competent to conclude the Agreement. The reason why in the decided case the Court denied the application of Article 3(2) TFEU was that:
[ The situation with respect to the required modification of the Regulation on jurisdiction is entirely different. Regulation 1215/2012 is part of the EU legal order, and its amendment would affect and alter its core jurisdiction rules, since these would be considerably extended if one only takes the so far very limited competence of the national courts in Article 24 (4) which would be replaced by the jurisdiction rules of the UPC. One may ask the question why the CJEU did not deal with this question in its Opinion of 8 March 2011. 29 The explanation is that there was no need to discuss this point since compatibility with the Treaty had already been denied by the CJEU on other grounds. Also, there was no specific question asked with respect to Article 3(2) TFEU. 
